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Abstract
The ’ontic’ form of structural realism (OSR), roughly speaking, aims
at a complete elimination of objects of the discourse of scientific theo-
ries, leaving us with structures only. As put by the defenders of such
a claim, the idea is that all there is are structures and, if the relevant
structures are to be set theoretical constructs, as it has also been claimed,
then the relations which appear in such structures should be taken to be
’relations without the relata’. As far as we know, there is not a defini-
tion of structure in standard mathematics which fits their intuitions, and
even category theory seems do not correspond adequately to the OSR
claims. Since OSR is also linked to the semantic approach to theories,
the structures to be dealt with are (at least in principle) to be taken as
set theoretical constructs. But these are ’relational’ structures where the
involved relations are built from basic objects (in short, the rank of the
relation is greater than the rank of the relata), and so no elimination of
the relata is possible, although it would be interesting for characterizing
OSR. In this paper we present a definition of a relation which does not
depend on the particular objects being related in the sense that the ’rela-
tion’ continues to hold even if the relata are exchanged by other suitable
ones. Although there is not a ’complete’ elimination of the relata, there is
an elimination of ’particular’ relata, and so our definition might be viewed
as an alternative way of finding adequate mathematical ’set-theoretical’
frameworks for describing at least some of the intuitions regarding OSR.
1 Introduction
Philosophers have recently distinguished between two forms of structural real-
ism (SR), namely, the epistemic form and the ontic form (Ladyman 1998, French
& Ladyman forthcoming, French 2003, which are indicated for details not re-
called here). In short, the epistemic form of SR sustains that the objects of
our scientific theories (like electrons etc.) remain epistemologically inaccessible
and that all we know are the structural elements (structures) of our theories.
But the idea of epistemologically inaccessible objects raises a lot of philosophi-
cal problems regarding, for instance, the underdetermination whereby quantum
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mechanics supports both a metaphysics of individuals and a metaphysics of non-
individuals (French op. cit.). To surmount these (and other) concerns, Ladyman
(op. cit.) has proposed the ontic form of SR, which entails (at least ideally) the
complete elimination of objects, leaving us with structures only. As put by
French, ”the idea is that it is not just that all we know are the structures, but
that all that there is are the structures” (op. cit.).
A natural question arises: what is a structure in the SR ’ontic’ sense? In the
above mentioned papers, no ’definition’ of structure is given, although the ques-
tion regarding the understanding of these structures has being invoked (French
& Ladyman op. cit.). As far as we know, no satisfactory discussion on this
important topic was provided yet.1 So, how can we understand what the in-
volved people mean by a ’structure’? Independently of the answer, the above
guidelines would entail that the concept of structure should not depend on the
particular objects being structured.
Pushing a little bit the proposals of the ontic SR, we find Ladyman suggesting
that his view should be developed within the context of the semantic approach to
theories, for in this approach a scientific theory is better understood throughout
a family of models (which are structures of a kind), and hence this should fit
quite nicely the intended proposal of looking at structures only. In addition,
he has also suggested the use of ’partial’ structures, which generalize the usual
’total’ structures, which we recall are also set theoretical constructs.2
But, following these guidelines, we should keep aware that both total and
partial structures are mathematical constructs built within set theory and, as
such, these ’set-theoretical’ structures were not born as structures from the
beginning. Instead, structures are constructed from basic operations on sets,
according to a well known process provided by axiomatic set theory. In short, a
structure results to be a n-tuple whose elements are sets and relations on these
sets. This fits the idea that they are to be regarded always ”in relational terms”
(French & Ladyman op. cit.) (from now on, when mentioning set theoretical
structures, we shall keep with first order structures, but of course a more general
characterization can be obtained as it is necessary for discussing structures
adequate for physics, where the notion of species of structures is relevant). But,
given structuralism, these structures and relations, the mentioned authors claim,
should not depend of the relata, and hence we arrive at the problem they face:
”how can we have structures without objects?” (ibid.). As it is well known, in
1It is not clear either if the philosophy of the ontic SR aims at to ’define’ structure in some
way or intends to take it as a primitive idea. In this second case, relevant axioms should be
provided (see below).
2We shall not discuss the reasons for such uses here, to which we suggest the reading of
their papers. But let us recall that ’standard’ structures are total in the sense that all relations
are total in the following sense: given a binary relation R on a set A, then for every ordered
pair 〈x, y〉 ∈ A× A, either the pair belongs to R or does not. In other words, R can be seen
as a pair R = 〈R1, R2〉 where R1 is the collection of all pairs which belong to R and R2 is
the collection of all pairs which do not. Partial relations can be viewed instead as triples
R = 〈R1, R2, R3〉, where R1 and R2 are as above and R3 is the collection of pairs to which
we don’t know whether they belong to R or not. The use of partial structures in philosophy
of science can be seen in da Costa & French 2003.
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(extensional) set theoretical terms, no relation (as sets of ordered n-tuples) can
be built out of the related elements.
One may guess that instead of set theory one could make use of category
theory, which at least in principle should deal with structures in its basic on-
tology, so apparently being in accordance with the very idea of the ontic SR.
The reasons the mentioned philosophers don’t use category theory is still not
clear to me,3 but perhaps this is due to the fact that from an intuitive point
of view a category is nothing more than an ordered pair (hence a set) whose
elements are a collection of objects (the structures) and a collection whose ele-
ments are called morphisms (both concepts are of course subjected to adequate
postulates). That is, even in category theory we are not completely free from
(intuitive) set theory. This of course does not entail that category theory can-
not be useful for the philosophical discussions on SR, mainly if we use another
kind of approach not so ’linked’ to set-theoretical ideas, like the category theory
developed by Obin˜a (1969). But this is something to be investigated further.
An interesting topic to be also investigated further in connection to Ladyman’s
ontic SR would be the development of a ’partial category theory’, where the ob-
jects would be partial structures, and not ’total’ ones, as in standard category
theory.
In this paper, we shall sketch the main ideas of a way of defining structures
which, in a sense, do not depend of the objects being related by the relations
they involve. The meaning of this ’in a sense’ will be made clear below. So,
we are not discussing the philosophical foundations of the ontic SR, but just
trying to answer French & Ladyman’s question: ”how can we have structures
without objects?”, put by them in the following alternative form: ”how can we
have an effect without a something which is doing the effecting?” (op. cit.). As
we shall see, the answer depends on the understanding of the something in this
phrase. In a future work, we intend to investigate the idea of taking the notion of
’structure’ as a primitive concept, subjected to adequate axioms, which perhaps
will be closer to French & Ladyman’s interests in finding a way of expressing
’pure’ structure (without elements) within a mathematical framework. Hence,
this paper can be seen as a first attempt to approach the subject by using an
alternative mathematical device.
It should be remarked that this paper, although motivated by French and
Ladyman’s intuitions, does not intend to cover his ideas in totum. What we of-
fer here is a way of looking to relational structures where the involved relations
do not depend on the particular objects being related, but only of their ’kind’
(or sort). As a motivation for what we shall present next, let us pose the basic
question from the following point of view: we could ask, for instance, either it
is possible to have an effect without something which produces it. Without en-
tering in metaphysical disputes, we can say that once having an effect, we tend
to accept that there is something which has produced such an effect; but in
regarding quantum entities, which are the case we shall look more closely here,
the fact is that a certain ’effect’ produced by a certain entity (say, an electron)
3Recently, it seems that Elaine Landry has getting some results in this direction.
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could be produced by whatever ’similar’ one (by ’another’ electron). Something
’produced’ by a microscopic entity could be produced by whatever microscopic
entity of the same species, or sort (electrons, say). So, may be we don’t need
to have the very object which has produced a certain effect, and all we need is
the general structure of ’something’ that has produced it (say, by knowing that
it was an electron, and whatever electron could do the job as well). It is in this
sense that our definition given below works. We shall provide the grounds for
defining structures in a way so that by adequate exchange of its basic elements,
the ’skeleton’ of the relevant relations shall be preserved. These relations can
then be useful for constructing structures which might be interesting for sus-
taining at least some aspects of OSR (’ontic’ structural realism).
Insisting a little bit on the differences of approaches, we remark that Lady-
man’s original proposal has motivated the developments given here, but he is
looking for a notion of structure without objects in the relevant relations, and
it seems difficult to say how this can be achieved in set theoretical terms, for
a relation is always constructed from the objects it relates (in extensional con-
texts).4 Anyway, our definition given below is so that the relations must be
based on ’kinds of particulars’, and not on specific elements, and in a certain
sense it seems to be closer to Eddington’s and Cassirer’s structuralism, which
are based on quantum indistinguishability, although we shall also not pursue
these relationships here (but see French 2003; French & Krause forthcoming,
Chap. 3.).
We shall proceed as follows: in the next section we recall in brief the objec-
tions to the standard (set-theoretical) definition of relation and structure for the
ontic form of SR. In recalling them, we can arrive at an interesting motivation
which will guide the developments given in the remaining of the paper. After
this digression, we shall introduce the basic intuition we shall pursue latter,
taken from some simple examples from chemistry. Finally, we introduce the
basic ideas of the mathematical stuff we shall be dealing with for the character-
ization of relations without the (specific) relata in the final sections. Some ideas
involving ’structural objects’ shall be mentioned at the end.
2 The structure of a relation
Since the ontic SR intends to make use of the semantic approach, structures
should be set-theoretical constructs, that is, mathematical objects of the form
A = 〈A,R〉i∈I , where A is a set obtained by set-theoretical operations on some
’base sets’ (in the sense of Bourbaki 1968; see also da Costa forthcoming) and
the Ri form a sequence of relations on A.5 Here, for simplicity, we shall take
first order structures of the form A = 〈A,R〉, where A is a non empty set and
R is a binary relation on A, although, some other cases may be used in the
examples below. As already mentioned above, in doing physics one needs more
4A work in this sense is been delineated jointly with N. da Costa and S. French.
5In mentioning Bourbaki, we are not claiming that we are accepting here his ’syntactic’
approach to mathematics.
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Figure 1: The relation R
than first order structures, but the considerations to be made here can be seen
as a first sketch of an idea which can be generalised for higher order structures;
this generalisation is left to be investigated further.
In standard mathematics (read: an extensional set theory like ZFC with
the axiom of foundation), in order to define a relation R on a set A, we need
that the set A had been constructed before. Technically, we may say that
the rank of R is greater than the rank of A in the cumulative hierarchy.6 Al-
though Russell’s concept of the structure of a relation (Russell 1974, Chap.
6) is already part of history and has been precisely described within the set-
theoretical framework (as mentioned below), we may gain in having a look at
some of his ideas, for the involved intuitions fit in much what we are trying
to say here.7 Given a certain relation R as a collection of ordered pairs, say
R = {(a, b), (a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (c, e), (d, e)} defined on A = {a, b, c, d, e}, we may
characterize the ’structure’ of R by representing R as a ’map’, as showed in
the Figure 1 and then ’abstracting’ the elements of A, keeping with the schema
shown in the Figure 2.
According to Russell, the ’structure’ of R should not depend on the par-
ticular terms forming part of the field of the relation, which should be modi-
fied without altering its structure (ibid., p. 63).8 So, in the Figure 2, the •’s
should stand for ’places’ of elements of a set that has the same ’relation num-
ber’ than R (in Russell’s terminology, the relation number of R is the class
of all relations similar to R, that is, those that have the same structure than
R). Then, according to this idea, we would be able to substitute the bullets
by elements of another set B by ’preserving the structure’ of R. But simply
substitutions do not ensure that the structure is preserved. For instance, take
B = {a′, b′, c′, d′, e′}. Here a first restriction arises: B must have the same car-
dinality of A.9 Let us suppose this for simplicity. If we simply substitute the
6For instance, a binary relation R on a set A is a set of ordered pairs of elements of A; so,
to obtain R we must go up in the hierarchy of sets, starting with elements x, y of A, then
obtaining the sets {x} and {x, y} and then the pairs {{x}, {x, y}} = 〈x, y〉.
7These concepts were developed in deep in Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathemat-
ica, but here we need only the basic intuitive motivations, and this is why we keep with
Russell’s 1974 book as our main reference on these matters.
8The field of a relation is the union of its domain with the domain of its inverse. In the
present case, it is the set A itself.
9This kind of restriction runs in the directions of the criticisms directed to Russell by
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Figure 2: The structure of R
elements of B for the corresponding elements of A, does this entail that a relation
S = {(a′, b′), (a′, c′), (a′, d′), (b′, c′), (c′, e′), (d′, e′)} with ’the same structure’ will
be found? Not necessarily, of course, for the elements of B may be not related
as are the elements of A. The substitution will give the right result if and only if
B is already ’structured as A is’, but to ensure the success of the substitutions,
we need to know that in advance. In the present day language of set theory,
we say that 〈A,R〉 and 〈B,S〉 are similar, or have the same structure iff there
exists a bijection from f : A 7→ B such that (x, y) ∈ R iff (f(x), f(y)) ∈ S. But,
let us insist, given A and B, of course there is no reason to guess that such an
f exists. Simple substitution of the elements of an arbitrary B for the elements
of A does not entail similarity.
We need some care here in speaking about these ’substitutions’ for not con-
fusing it with the process of abstraction in mathematics. In mathematics, when
a mathematician says ”if l and m are lines with slopes k1 and k2 such that
k1.k2 = −1, then they are orthogonal”, he is not making reference to particular
(individual) lines in the plane, but to arbitrary lines provided that the condition
of the antecedent of the conditional is fulfilled (hence, l and m act as ’param-
eters’). If we ’substitute’ l and m in this sentence for slopes of particular lines
(say, by those of x − y + 1 = 0 and x + y + 1 = 0), the resulting sentence is of
course true. But, it should be remarked, it holds only if l and m are already
known to be lines with slopes k1 and k2 such that k1.k2 = −1. This seems to
be obvious, but is a distinctive fact which explains what we are proposing. In
other words, to preserve the truth of a sentence like that of the slopes, we need
to know previously the mathematical structure of the involved elements (that
is, that they are lines with certain well defined slopes and so on) for, if not,
the sentence would be false. In Russell’s example, we have a set (a collection of
objects) which are related in some way by R, and the relation will be ’preserved’
not by arbitrary substitutions, but if and only if we substitute the elements of
the given set by elements of another set whose elements are already structured in
the same way as A is, although these elements can be of distinct nature or being
themselves distinctly ’structured’.10 For instance, take A = {a, b, c, d} endowed
with a reflexive relation whose elements (other than the pairs (x, x) –which are
Newman; see Newman 1928. I thank S. French for mentioning this point.
10Here, by ’structured elements’ we mean the very structure the objects can have by them-
selves, and not the structure the set of which they are elements (see the next example).
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in the relation– are (a, b), (a, c), (b, d), (c, d). Now take B = {∅, {a}, {b}, {a, b}},
with a 6= b. Then of course 〈A,R〉 and 〈B,⊆〉 are similar, but the elements
of A and B do not need to have ’the same structure’ (the elements of A and
B themselves don’t need to be ’similar’; A may be a set of numbers, and B
a set of set of numbers). In short: the simple exchange of elements, without
taking them from an similarly structured set, do not necessarily ’preserve the
structure’, that’s what we are insisting to say (the relevance of this ’obvious’
fact will be made clear below). But of course if we substitute the elements of
A by ’similarly structured’ objects, then the structure (on A) will be preserved.
For instance, consider substitution of elements of groups by elements of isomor-
phic groups. But in this case we need to know in advance that the elements to
be substituted do have already the desired structure in order the substitution
works. It seems that if we can find a kind of relation which enables substitutions
of its basic elements so that the structure is preserved, than we could arrive at
a relation (and so at structures) which in a sense do not depend on the (partic-
ular) elements being related, and give perhaps a different way of looking at the
concept of invariance. Let us try to make sense to this idea.
In the empirical sciences, the above schema of simple substitutions by ’pre-
serving the structure’ makes sense. Really, we can find examples of situations
where ’simple substitutions’ can take place without taking the elements from
already known similar structures. The only we need to know is that the involved
elements must be substituted by indistinguishable ones, but not necessarily be-
longing to a similarly structured set. In these sciences, Russell’s claim that ”the
field [of a ’relation’] can be modified without altering the structure” (Russell
op. cit., p. 63) can be realized. Let us consider this case by mentioning some
few simple examples, for they will motivate the definition we shall give below.
The structure of R given by the map of Figure 1 above resembles in much
structural formulas of chemical compounds. Let us take the ethylic alcohol to
exemplify (Figure 3). In this case, instead of the elements of A, we have the
symbols H, C and O, which should be seen (as they of course are) as places for
carbon, hydrogen and oxygen atoms. In other words, what we are expressing
with the Figure 3 is not something concerning a set of particular individuals like
the set A above; the ethylic molecule is not simple a collection (set) of certain
atoms. A chemical substance like C2H6O may originate different chemical com-
pounds, which are described by presenting their structural formulas; depending
on the arrangement of the atoms (their structure, or form), the same collec-
tion of carbons, hydrogens and oxygens may produce quite different chemical
substances, called isomers (and the same happens in several other cases). For
instance, C2H6O may stand for both CH3 − CH2 −OH, the ethylic alcohol and
H3C−O− CH3, the methylic ether (Figure 4). So, certain structures appear
in these situations.
Russell’s concept of the ’number of a relation’ helps in fixing the idea. But,
while (as we have seem) in standard mathematics the simple substitution of
the elements of A by other elements does not ensure that the relation is pre-
served, in chemistry if we substitute the elements by similar ones, we do find
the ’same’ chemical element, regarded that H atoms are substituted by H atoms
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and so on (we are talking in general terms, so we shall not discuss how such
a substitution can be performed, but simply assume that it can be done, even
in ideal terms. Perhaps more adequate examples can be found by chemists or
quantum physicists). This is an important point for the definition we will give
latter: we can (at least ideally) substitute the H, C and O atoms by ’other’ H,
C and O atoms respectively by ’preserving the structure’.11 This fact is nicely
exemplified by Roger Penrose in the context of quantum mechanics (which of
course would provide most adequate examples of what we are trying to say):
”according to the modern theory [quantum mechanics], if a particle
of a person’s body were exchanged with a similar particle in one
of the bricks of his house then nothing would happened at all.”
(Penrose 1989, p. 360)
So, in chemistry, the kind of ’substitutional’ property of atoms in a certain
structure makes it in certain sense to be independent of the particular (individ-
ual) involved elements. If we imagine that the structural formula of the ethylic
alcohol represents a certain ’relation’ among the H, C and O atoms (which is of
11Let us recall once more that some care is in need here: in standard mathematics, if 〈A,R〉
and 〈B,S〉 are similar, of course we can do the substitution, but given 〈A,R〉 and a (non
structured) set B, there is no way of sustaining that a similar structure 〈B,S〉 can be found
(that is, that a similar relation S on B will be found), as it happens in chemistry. In other
words, in substituting the elements of A by the elements of B, we need first to check (so to
say, ’by hand’) if the elements of B are also in the relation. In chemistry, by the contrary, we
know that in advance: substitution of elements by similar (indistinguishable) ones (H by H,
C by C etc.) do preserve the structure.
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course what is happening), then its chemical properties do not depend on the
particular atoms being involved. So, there is a ’relation’ which can be said to
be independent of the individual relata it links (except in what respects their
’nature’ –see below). Let us reinforce this idea of the independence of particu-
lar elements that enter in a certain effect by giving another example. Take for
instance a simple chemical reaction
NO +O3 → NO2 +O2,
where one nitric oxide molecule reacts with one ozone molecule to produce one
nitrogen dioxide molecule and one oxygen molecule. We remark that it is not
important what particular oxygen atom (there are three) was captured by the
nitric oxide molecule to form the nitrogen dioxide; the only relevant fact is
that the captured element must be one oxygen atom. Thus Toraldo di Francia
says: ”this enable us to put within parentheses the true nature of the entities
and emphasize the only secure property: the number!” (1986, p. 122). Really,
every oxygen atom of the ozone molecule plays the same role in the reaction.
Only the quantity of them is important, and for sure the same holds in the
quantum context in regarding elementary particles. The definitions we shall
present below intend to capture such situations in a set-theoretical framework.
For understanding them, let us mark the fact that in the exemplified case there
is a certain range of possibilities from where the oxygen atom can be taken
(namely, the ozone molecule that enter in the reaction). Below we shall speak
of the ’surroundings’ of a certain collection of elements, which will stand for a
zone from which the elements to be exchanged should be ’taken’, and the above
exemplified kind of exchange shall be captured by a theorem to be presented
below (Theorem 3.1). Further examples will also be mentioned below.
So, what we are approaching is a characterization of a concept of structure
which mirrors what happens in chemical (and of course in quantum) situations,
but we shall try to do it in set-theoretical terms: as we will see, we shall have
a certain relation R, given as a ’set’ (really, a ’quasi-set’) of ordered ’pairs’ so
that when the elements of these pairs are ’exchanged’ by suitable ones (we shall
say that they are ’indistinguishable’ in a sense to be explicated below) then
the relation ’continues to hold’, which is of course contrary to the case involving
standard relations of usual set theories, due to the axiom of extensionality, as we
have seen. But, first, let us turn to the general ideas involving the mathematical
framework we shall be working within, namely, quasi-set theory.
3 The mathematical framework: general ideas
on quasi-set theory
Intuitively speaking, a quasi-set is a collection of indistinguishable (but not iden-
tical) objects.12 This of course is not a strict ’definition’ of a quasi-set, acting
more or less as Cantor’s ’definition’ of the concept of set as ”a collection into a
12For details, see Krause 1992, 1996, 2003.
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whole of distinct elements of our intuition or of our thought” (Cantor 1958, p.
85). Although not precise, this characterization gives an intuitive account of the
concept. The quasi-set theory Q was developed following Erwing Schro¨dinger’s
remark that the concept of identity cannot be applied to elementary particles
(Schro¨dinger 1952, pp. 17-18); this idea is expressed in the theory by assuming
that expressions like x = y are generally not well-formed formulas (and like-
wise for the negation x 6= y). But there is a concept of ’indistinguishability’
(≡) that may hold among the entities of the theory. This enable us to con-
sider logico-mathematical systems in which identity and indistinguishability are
separated concepts; that is, these concepts do not reduce to one another as in
standard (Leibnizian) set theories. So, we could say, paraphrasing Cantor, that
a quasi-set is a collection of elements to which we cannot say either they are
identical or distinct from one another. An important fact is that this is not an
epistemological ignorance; it is rather ontological, essentially due to the lack of
sense in applying the concept of identity to some of the objects of the domain.
Quasi-set theory Q allows two kinds of Urelemente: the m-atoms, whose
intended interpretation are the quanta (and perhaps macroscopic things like
atoms and molecules), and theM -atoms, which stand for usual objects, to which
classical logic is supposed to apply.13 Quasi-sets are the collections obtained
by applying ZFU-like (Zermelo-Fraenkel plus Urelemente) axioms to a basic
domain composed of m-atoms, M -atoms and aggregates of them.14 The theory
still admits a primitive concept of quasi-cardinal which intuitively stands for the
‘quantity’ of objects in a collection. The main idea is that the quasi-cardinal of a
quasi-set cannot be associated (in the sense of this association being something
described in the ‘classical’ part of Q –see Figure 5) to a particular ordinal due
to the (absolute) indistinguishability of the m-atoms, and this is the motive for
taking this concept as primitive. Notwithstanding this, it is possible to define
a translation from the language of ZFU into the language of Q in such a way
so that there is a ‘copy’ of ZFU in Q (the ‘classical’ part of Q). In this copy,
all the usual mathematical concepts can be defined, and the ‘sets’ (really, the
‘Q-sets’) turn out to be those quasi-sets whose transitive closure (this concept
is like the usual one) do not contain m-atoms (see again the Figure 5).15
In Q there may exist quasi-sets whose elements are m-atoms only, termed
‘pure’ quasi-sets, whose elements are indistinguishable (in the sense of partak-
ing the primitive indistinguishability relation ≡) and the axioms provide the
grounds for saying that nothing in the theory can distinguish the elements of
such an x from the others. The axioms of ≡ are those of an equivalence relation.
Furthermore, we can define an ’extensional identity’ (=E) among all those ob-
jects of the domain which are not m-atoms, and so that it will act as the usual
13But of course other kinds of logic could be used instead with due adaptations.
14Perhaps for some applications it would be interesting to have, say, ’quasi-classes’, and so
we could use NBG-like axioms.
15So, we can make sense to the primitive concept of quasi-cardinal of a quasi-set x (written
qc(x)) as being a cardinal defined in the ’classical’ part of the theory. When the existence of
m-atoms is postulated, apparently there is no way of defining a translation from Q to ZFC,
so the theories are not equiconsistent.
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Figure 5: The Quasi-Set Universe
identity of ZFC for those entities to which it applies. Within the theory, the idea
that there is more than one entity in x is expressed by an axiom which states
that the quasi-cardinal of the power quasi-set of x (the concept of subquasi-set
is like that of standard set theory)16 has quasi-cardinal 2qc(x), where qc(x) is
the quasi-cardinal of x (which is a cardinal obtained in the ‘copy’ of ZFU just
mentioned). Now, one can ask: what does this supposition mean?
Consider the three protons and the four neutrons in the nucleus of a 7Li
atom (alternatively we could take the three oxygen atoms of the ozone molecule
of our previous example). As far as quantum mechanics goes, nothing distin-
guishes among these three protons. If we regard these protons as (intuitively)
forming a quasi-set, its quasi-cardinal should to be 3, and there is no apparent
contradiction in saying that there are also 3 subquasi-sets with 2 elements each.
In the same vein, it is reasonable to say that there are three ’singletons’ and
so on, although we can’t distinguish among them either (we will say that they,
so as their collections with the same quasi-cardinal, are indistinguishable). So,
it is reasonable to postulate that the quasi-cardinal of the power quasi-set of
x is 2qc(x). Whether we can distinguish among these subquasi-sets or not is a
matter which does not concern logic (and of course even physically this cannot
be done).
In other words, we may reason as if there are three entities in our quasi-set
x (in our example above), but x must be regarded as a collection for which it
is not possible to discern its elements as individuals. Although we can suppose
their existence, the theory does not enable us to write down the corresponding
singletons, as we do in ZFC when we write {a}, {b} and {c}, given a, b and
c. In Q, there are no names for the m-atoms. The grounds for such kind of
16This is what makes a basic difference with fuzzy sets. In fuzzy set theory, as it is well-
known, the counter-domains of the characteristic functions are not {0, 1}, but [0, 1].
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reasoning has been delineated by Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia as partly
theoretical and partly experimental. Speaking of electrons instead protons, they
noted that in the case of the helium atom we can say that there are two electrons
because, theoretically, the appropriate wave function depends on six coordinates
and thus “. . . we can therefore say that the wave function has the same degrees
of freedom as a system of two classical particles” (op. cit., p. 268).17 Dalla
Chiara and Toraldo di Francia have also noted that, “[e]xperimentally, we can
ionize the atom (by bombardment or other means) and extract two separate
electrons . . .” (ibid.).
Of course, the electrons can be counted as two only at the moment of mea-
surement; as soon as they interact with other electrons (of the measurement
apparatus, for example) they enter into entangled states once more. It is on
this basis that one can say that there are two electrons in the helium atom
or six in the 2p level of the sodium atom or (by similar considerations) three
protons in the nucleus of a 7Li atom (and it may be contended that the ‘the-
oretical’ ground for reasoning in this way also depends on these experimental
considerations, together with the legacy of classical metaphysics). On this ba-
sis we formulate the axiom of ‘weak extensionality’ of Q, which says that those
quasi-sets that have the same quantity of elements of the same sort (in the sense
that they belong to the same equivalence class of indistinguishable objects) are
also indistinguishable.
This axiom has interesting consequences. There is no space here for the de-
tails, but let us mention just one of them which is related to the above discussion
on the non observability of permutations in quantum physics, which is one of
the most basic facts regarding indistinguishable quanta (recall Penrose’s quota-
tion given above). In standard set theories (ZFC), if w ∈ x and z /∈ x, then of
course (x−{w})∪{z} = x iff z = w. That is, we can ’exchange’ (without mod-
ifying the original arrangement) two elements iff they are the same elements,
by force of the axiom of extensionality. But in Q we can prove the theorem
below, where z (and similarly w) stands for a quasi-set with quasi-cardinal 1
whose only element is indistinguishable from z (respectively, from w –the reader
shouldn’t think that this element is identical to either z or w, for the relation of
equality doesn’t apply here;18 the set theoretical operations can be understood
according to their usual definitions):
Theorem 3.1 [Unobservability of Permutations] Let x be a finite quasi-set such
that x does not contains all indistinguishable from z, where z is an m-atom such
17This might be associated to the legacy of Schro¨dinger, who says that this kind of formu-
lation “gets off on the wrong foot” by initially assigning particle labels and then permuting
them before extracting combinations of appropriate symmetry (Schro¨dinger 1998).
18The only we can say is that the element that belongs to z is indistinguishable from
z. It would be a fallacy to think that since we can talk of the only element of z which is
indistinguishable from z, then we are individuating it. The important fact is that in Q we
can express set-theoretically the invariance of permutations; that what import is that we
could think of another indistinguishable from z forming another of such ’singletons’, and no
appreciable differences between them would be found. So, no identification is possible, and
we definitively do not know either we are working with a certain m-atom or with another
indistinguishable one. As in physics, this does not matter.
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that z ∈ x. If w ≡ z and w /∈ x, then there exists w such that
(x− z) ∪ w ≡ x
The proof makes use of several axioms of quasi-set theory, and shall be not
repeated here (but see Krause 2003). Supposing that x has n elements, then
if we ‘exchange’ their elements z by correspondent indistinguishable elements
w (set theoretically, this means to perform the operation (x − z) ∪ w), then
the resulting quasi-set remains indistinguishable from the original one in the
sense of the weak extensionality axiom. In a certain sense, it is not important
whether we are dealing with x or with (x − z) ∪ w. This of course gives a
’set-theoretical’ sense to Penrose’s claim mentioned above. So, within Q we
can express that ’permutations are not observable’. Perhaps another physical
situation may reinforce the claim: suppose that an electron a is absorbed by
an atom and becomes entangled with the electrons in the outer shell of this
atom (this outer shell is our quasi-set x).19 Then, some time latter, an electron
b is emitted from the atom. Could we say that this ’new’ atom is the same
(in an extensional sense) than the previous one we had before having absorbed
the electron? Of course not, for there is no sense in saying that that a is
identical to b or that it is not. The most we can say is that ’both atoms’ are
indistinguishable, which is expressed by Theorem 3.1, an play the same role in
whatever application or theoretical consideration.
The theory has other applications, for instance in deriving quantum statistics
without the needs of postulating certain symmetry conditions, but these devel-
opments shall be not mentioned here (see Krause et al. 1999; Krause 2003).
4 Relations without the relata
Keeping with quasi-set theory in mind, we may turn to a characterization of
certain relational structures in which the involved relations do not depend on
the (particular) elements being related. In this section we shall be working
within the theory Q, and we will emphasize the case involving m-atoms only.
A quasi-relation on a quasi-set A is a quasi-set R whose elements are ordered
’pairs’ that belong to A. These ’pairs’ should also be understood in a right
way. Since the identity relation cannot be used here, an ordered ’pair’ 〈z, w, 〉 is
something like the collection (quasi-set) of the indistinguishable from z (denoted
[z]) and the collection of the indistinguishable from either z or w (denoted [z, w])
that belong to A; in symbols, 〈z, w, 〉 =df [[z], [z, w]], which resembles Wiener-
Kuratowski’s definition. So, each ’pair’ may contains more than two elements
(the word ’pair’ here looks like ’pair of kinds’). So, a (binary) quasi-relation R
on A is a quasi-set which obeys the following predicate <:
<(R) =df ∀z(z ∈ R→ ∃u∃v(u ∈ A ∧ v ∈ A ∧ z =E 〈u, v〉)).
19We remark that this ’nomination’ of the electrons with a’s and b’s are only a way of
speech. We still remark that, as in standard set theory, (x− z) ∪ w ≡ (x ∪ w)− z.
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Then the question we would like to discuss may be summed up as follows
(formulated for more general relations):
Question: given a certain n-ary q-relation R on a pure qset A, if R(x1, . . . , xn)
holds, does R(x′1, . . . , x
′
n) also hold if xi ≡ x′i? In other words, are the relations
’preserved’ when the relata are exchanged by indistinguishable ones?
The first and direct answer to the above question is that it depends on the
relation. If R is membership, then the intended result fails, for if x ∈ y and
x ≡ x′, y ≡ y′, nothing in the axioms of the theory entails that x′ ∈ y′ (this is
one of the basic results that make the primitive relation of indistinguishability
distinct from identity). Membership is the only primitive relation of Q which
does not enable substitutivity by indistinguishable (Krause 2003). So, let us
take R to be whatever relation distinct from membership; furthermore, we shall
work with binary relations only for simplicity and we will be paying attention
to relations on quasi-sets whose elements are m-atoms only. So, the question,
put in a simple form, is: if R is a binary relation (distinct from membership)
and if R(x, y)∧x′ ≡ x∧y′ ≡ y, does this entail that R(x′, y′) holds as well? The
most interesting case is of course when both x and y are m-atoms (if there are
no m-atoms involved, then ≡ becomes (extensional) identity and the answer is
a straightforward yes).
Let us suppose for simplicity that R is defined on a finite pure qset, which
suffice for our purposes. But R(x, y) means 〈x, y〉 ∈ R, that is, [[x], [x, y]] ∈ R.
Recall that [x] is the qset of all indistinguishable from x (which may have more
than one element) and that [x, y] is the qset of the indistinguishable of either
x or y and that x and y are not playing the role of names for objects of the
domain;20 instead, they act as generalized names, meaning something like ’some’
indistinguishable from x or y respectively. So, a binary relation in the theory
Q is not a well ’defined’ (by its extension) collection of ordered pairs of the
elements of some set. If R(x, y) holds, we are not necessarily saying that that
specific x and that specific y are in the relation, but that some indistinguishable
from x is in the relation with some indistinguishable from y. But the problem
now is to explain the sense of being R defined on a certain A, for if x′ and
y′ are indistinguishable respectively from x and y, how can we ensure that,
being R(x, y) true, the same happens with R(x′, y′)? (for x′ and y′ may be not
members of A). So, the apparent answer to our Question would be no.
But there is a sense in preserving this result (that is, in answering it with
an ’yes’) if we consider what we shall term the surroundings of the qset A.21
The surroundings of A is defined relatively to a qset D which contains A; the
definition is SurD(A) =df [y ∈ D : y ≡ x∧x ∈ A]. In words, it is the qset of the
elements of D which are indistinguishable from the elements of A. Intuitively,
20To distinguish quasi-sets from usual sets, in writing quasi-sets we use ’[’ and ’]’ instead of
’{’ and ’}’; so, our ’classifier’ is written [ : ].
21In Krause 2003, we have termed it the ’cloud’ of A. But the term ’surroundings’ seems to
be more adequate in expressing from where the elements to be exchanged by the elements of
A are to be taken. In physics, this stand for the experimental apparatus of another chemical
compound which may provide the relevant elements for the exchanges.
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Figure 6: A and its surroundings.
SurD(A) acts as the surroundings from where A can ’exchange’ elements (see
Figure 6). Let us suppose that R̂ is the extension of R to SurD(A), that is R̂ is
the qset of all ’pairs’ 〈x, y〉 with x and y in SurD(A) such that 〈x, y〉 ∈ R when
x, y ∈ A. Then we can prove in Q the following result (the terminology is as
above):
Theorem 4.1 If A ⊆ D, x, y ∈ A and R(x, y), where R is a quasi-relation on
A, then there exist x′, y′ ∈ D such that x′ ≡ x and y′ ≡ y so that R̂(x′, y′).
The proof is straightforward: if ¬R̂(x′, y′), since ∀x(x ≡ x) is an axiom of
Q, then we would have that R(x, y) but ¬R̂(x, y), which is impossible by the
definition of R̂.
Intuitively, the theorem says that if R(x, y) holds for x, y ∈ A, then if x′
and y′ are indistinguishable from x and y respectively and belong to a quasi-
set D which includes A, then R̂ holds for these elements (that is, R̂(x′, y′)
holds). We remark that there would be no mathematical sense in saying (in
the general case) that R(x′, y′) holds, for x′ and y′ may do not belong to A,
and R is a quasi-relation defined on A. The extension R̂ of R plays the role
of R for the elements of the surroundings of A and coincides with R within A.
So, in saying that R̂(x′, y′) holds, we are in a certain sense granting that the
relation R is maintained (though R̂) when the elements it relates are exchanged
by suitable (indistinguishable) ones (say, taken from its neighborhood, like the
measurement apparatus), and hence it does not depend on the particular relata
it relates (as individuals). It seems to me that this is precisely what the chemical
situations involving ionization and others among the above exemplified cases are
suggesting us.
5 Structures and Structural Objects
The consideration of quasi-sets and their surroundings in the above sense unable
us to consider relational structures (partial relations and structures could be also
considered in a suitable extension of these ideas) in the usual sense (that is, as
collections of quasi-sets and relations among them which can be ’extended’ to
their surroundings as above). So, we may arrive at a definition of structures
which do not depend on the particular relata they link (as individuals). In
other words, in this approach we can have the effects, described by the relevant
relations, without a something (as an individual) which is doing the effect, to
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use French & Ladyman’s mentioned phrase. It seems that it is a case like this
one that chemistry postulate: the effect of, say, the methylic ether molecule
can be seen as independent of whether the molecules are composed by this
or by that particular C, H and O atoms. Another example mentioned above
also helps here: in the chemical reaction NO2 +O3 → NO3 +O2, we have the
’effect’ of the creation of an NO2 molecule but in this process it is not relevant
the very individualistic nature of the particular oxygen atom (taken from the
O3 molecule) that enters in the reaction. Of course there is something doing
the effect, but only its nature (as an oxygen atom) as an entity of a certain kind
(or sort) is relevant.
The (perhaps) important remark to be made here is that our above defini-
tion enables us to consider these situations from a (quasi)set-theoretical point of
view, making sense to the intuitive idea that a body is something like a struc-
tured collection of something, although it cannot be regarded as a standard
set, as a collection of well defined and distinct objects. The idea that we may
have something being preserved in a thing (its structure) without any commit-
ment to the importance of the material of which it is composed, is implicit in
Schro¨dinger’s philosophy. According to him, among the basic features of an
object, there is its form or shape (Schro¨dinger 1952; Bitbol 1996, pp. 160ff). As
he says,
”. . . in palpable bodies, composed of many atoms, individuality
arises out of the structure of their composition, out or shape or
form, or organization, as we might call it in other cases. The iden-
tity of the material, if there is any, plays a subordinate role. You
may see this particularly well in cases when you speak of ’sameness’
though the material has definitively changed. A man returns after
twenty years of absence to the cottage where he spent his childhood.
. . . The shape and the organization of the whole place have remained
the same, in spite of the entire ’change of material’ in many of the
items . . . including, by the way, our traveller’s own body itself!” (op.
cit., p. 20)
By ‘shape’ here he means something given by sets of invariant properties,
like group transformations, but the invariants give us only kinds of entities (elec-
trons, for instance), and although in the everyday world we of course individuate
the objects by space-time trajectories, or substance or other means, such individ-
uation must be abandoned in the quantum realm, yet permanence of structure
(form) of the composed objects still remains. So, Schro¨dinger displays elements
of a structuralist tendency, although has accepted the non-individuality of the
basic compound elements (quantum particles) and has incorporated it within
a structuralist metaphysics. Perhaps quasi-set theory can capture at least part
of this approach in a mathematical alternative way. Anyway, to pursue the
relationships between structural realism and Schro¨dinger’s ideas is also a topic
for a future work.
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